PHIL 342 Handout 9: The Design (Teleological Arguments)

I. Analogical Arguments.

A. Inductive: only meant to establish the probability of their conclusions.

B. The Design Arguments are Arguments from Analogy.

C. Structure of Analogical Reasoning:

[1] A has properties p1, p2, p3, and p4.

[2] B has p1, p2, and p3.

[3] So, B probably has p4, too.

D. Analysis of Analogical Arguments:

1. A, B are items being compared.

2. P1 –p3 are “shared” or “common” properties.

3. P4 is the “inferred” property.

E. Questions to ask of analogical arguments.

1. Are the shared properties relevant to the inferred property?

2. Are there other disanalagous properties between A and B?

II. The notion of a “teleological system”: A system of parts that work together for some sort of purpose.

III. Paley's Teleological Argument:

A. The Central Argument: The concept of a teleological system.

[1] Machines are produced by intelligent design.

[2] The universe is like a machine.

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[3] Probably, the universe has a designer.

[4] Probably God is the designer of the universe.

B. Defense: [1] is obvious as the watch example illustrates. It works for a seeming purpose, is composed of parts, etc. [2] suggests that the universe appears as though it has been designed, so we are justified in inferring the existence of a designer.

IV. The Darwinian Challenge

A. The explanatory power of evolutionary theory diminishes the force of Paley’s argument. Darwin’s theory explains how the natural world functions as a teleological system, without appealing to a designer.

B. Note: The point here is not to argue for or against the plausibility of Natural Selection. Rather, we must acknowledge that once the Designer hypothesis has a clear rival hypothesis, the probability of the truth of the former is lessened.

V. Hume's Criticism: The Limits of Experience.

A. [2] is weak. While we commonly observe artifacts being designed and built, we have never observed the design of the universe.

B. If the inference to [3] is allowed, step [4] must be questioned. Rather than the Classical Theist's God, the Design Argument supports gods more like humans who are imperfect, mortal, etc., or else supports the idea that the world itself is a person.

III. Kant's Criticism: The Limits of Reason.

A. God and creation are not possible objects of human experience (God does not exist in space and time).

B. The Teleological argument asks for the causes of apparent design. As such it is dependent on the Cosmological Argument. But the Cosmological argument points to a necessarily existing being; that is, it depends ultimately on the Ontological argument which is unsound. [This is an interesting critique, but it is doubtful that it holds up under careful scrutiny.]

IV. More Recent Attempts: Tennant, Swinburne, and Van Inwagen (neither Tennant nor Van Inwagen’s arguments are included in Pojman).

A. Tennant: While Natural Selection (and now the Big Bang) detracts from the plausibility of the mechanical universe of Paley, even the contemporary view of nature seems to require design if it is intelligible. Consider:

1. knowability of the world (adaptation of thought to things).

2. internal adaptedness of organic beings.

3. fitness of the inorganic to minister to life.

4. aesthetic value of nature.

5. world's instrumentality in realizing moral ends.

6. culmination of evolution in humanity.

B. Swinburne: Paley's arguments are based on regularities of spatial order, but more impressive are regularities from temporal order (= laws of nature). Science cannot explain the existence for the most basic laws. They are what science appeals to in explaining other phenomena. The universe might have been chaotic, but it isn't. Such considerations raise the probability that God exists. Note: Swinburne intends this a C-inductive, rather than a P-inductive argument.

C. Criticisms of Swinburne:

1. Any possible universe is bound to have some order, so chaos is strictly impossible.

2. Consider the Anthropic Principle: it is inevitable that people perceive an ordered universe, since if it weren't ordered, they couldn't perceive it.

3. The choice is whether explanation stops with the universe or with God. In either case something is left unexplained. It's just an ad hoc proposal to insist that God's existence doesn't require explanation [sounds like the PSR issue again!].

D. Van Inwagen’s “New” Design Argument (aka – the “wider” teleological argument).

1. Central Idea: What conditions must be present in order for life to be possible? The universe could have developed in numerous ways following the “Big Bang.” If the rate of expansion of the universe had been even slightly faster, there would have been no chance of life developing. The probability is so low that the conditions were just right by chance that it is much more likely that a Designer fine-tuned the universe to ensure that life would develop.

2. Note that this version of the argument is still open to Hume’s central objection: even if the universe had a designer, what reason is there to suppose that this must be God? Part of the reply might be that this version of the Design argument is only meant to raise the probability that God exists. If it succeeds in raising the probability of the existence of a Designer, it seems that the probability of God’s existence is also raised at least somewhat. Also, this version of the design argument could be used in conjunction with other Theistic arguments (e.g., the Cosmological Argument) to raise more substantially the probability that God exists.

3. Major difficulty: If there have been millions of Big Bangs, the random probability of a universe being able to sustain life might be very high. Compare: the odds against getting a Royal Flush from a random draw are quite high. But if there are many thousands of decks from which five cards each are randomly drawn, the odds that at least one of them will produce a Royal Flush is greatly increased.

V. The Argument From Consciousness: Zombies for God (class discussion only).