I. Aquinas: Omnipotence means God can do anything that is logically possible (i.e., God can’t make married bachelors, etc.)
II. Omnipotence versus Almightiness (Geach – not in Pojman).
a. God can
do anything.
b. God can
do anything that is logically possible.
c. God can
do anything that is logically consistent with the nature of God.
d. If it's
logically possible that God will bring about a state of affairs,
then God can bring about that state of affairs.
a. God can't
defy logic (make square circles, etc.).
b. God can't
violate God's own nature (can't lie or be tempted, etc.).
c. God can't
bring about every state of affairs consistent with the nature of
God.
d. God can't
alter the past, etc.
III. Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence
(from Richard Gale's On the Nature and Existence of God and George
Mavrodes' "Some
Puzzles Concerning
Omnipotence").
[2] God either can or can not create a stone so heavy that even God cannot lift it.
[3] If God can create the stone, God is not, there is at least one thing God can't do.
[4] If God cannot create the stone, there is at least one thing God cannot do.
[5] If there is it at least one thing God can’t do, God is not omnipotent ([2] - [4]).
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[6] Therefore God does not exist ([1], [5]).
B. The paradox resolved:
1. There are
restrictions on God's omnipotence. As Aquinas noted, God can perform only
logically possible feats.
But also God's power is restricted by observing that some actions,
while logically possible, are not logically
consistent with having been done by God.
2. The paradox
is either question-begging or logically incoherent. If God is not
omnipotent, then there's no problem
in God creating a stone too heavy for even God to lift. But under the supposition
that God is omnipotent, it's
contradictory to suppose that there's a stone God can't lift (Mavrodes'
solution, see P 279)).
3. Frankfurt
(P 281-282) argues that if God can do one logically impossible thing (create
a stone so heavy it can’t
be lifted), then God can also do another logically impossible thing (lift
that stone).
[2] But a less than perfect being could have more perfect power than a perfect being.
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[3] So, an absolutely perfect being is less than perfect.
D. Why is this a paradox?
1. Moral
and Other Limits on Omnipotence: The appropriate doctrine of omnipotence
entails that all that God does
must be consistent with God's nature (i.e., God can't lie, be courageous,
chaste, break promises, cheat, or play
football, etc.).
2. Consider
a possible being, Nimrod. Suppose Nimrod can do everything God can do.
That is Nimrod is
omnipotent. But Nimrod is not perfect. Nimrod can play football, commit
suicide, perform immoral actions, etc.
Doesn't it follow that Nimrod has more freedom and more power than God?
C. Solutions to the Perfection Paradox
are difficult, but part of the answer lies in the conception of perfection
that is
operative in Theism.
E. Does Omnipotence include the ability to do wrong? Does God have the ability to perform morally reprehensible actions but refrains from them – or is it logically impossible for God to do wrong?
A. The problem: Can God create beings free to act beyond God's control?
-- Compare this question to the paradox of
the stone.
B. There are orders of omnipotence: O1 would include unlimited power to
act, while O2 would include unlimited power
to determine what powers other things should have. It seems that
God cannot have all orders of omnipotence at
once. Mackie conceded that this is a mistake, but maintains that the paradox
still forces a problem for theism with
respect to the problem of evil.