These GAO Tables appear in the paper, "Reflections on the GAO Report on
the Nuclear Triad, Science and Global Security 6,383-393 (1997) and in

U.S. Governmental Affairs Committee, Evaluation of the U.S. Strategic 
Triad, S.Hrg 103-457, 1994.  U.S. General Accounting Office, The U.S. 
Nuclear Triad:  GAO's Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization Program 
(plus 8 classified volumes), GAO/T-PEMD-93-5, 1993.
 
Tables:     I.1, I.2, I.3, II
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Table I.1:  The Air Leg:  Beliefs Versus Findings.  Only selected 
material on beliefs versus findings is presented here; classified 
information has been deleted.
 
BELIEF	FINDING     (I will type the belief first, then the finding in [  
] brackets)
 
1.  On Air Base Survivability
 
Bombers at bases have been vulnerable to surprise Soviet attack.
[The data show surprises attack to have been extremely unlikely.]
 
2.  On Penetration Survivability
 
Soviet air defenses have grown dramatically.  
[High growth did not occur.]
 
Soviet SAMSs and interceptors are very effective. 
[Combat experience and intelligence assessments indicate lesser 
capabilities.]
 
B-2 is needed to preserve the penetrating bomber role.
[Data show B-1B and B-52H can continue to be survivable penetrators.]
 
ACM is needed to overcome low ALCM survivability.
[Tests did not demonstrate low ALCM survivability.]
 
3.  On Target Coverage
 
Detectability and slowness make the air-leg "stabilizing."
[Available data support this belief.]
 
B-1B and B-2 have sufficient range for their strategic mission requirements.
[Insufficient evidence to support this belief; reliable test data are 
lacking.]
 
Bombers are readily recallable and retargetable under any scenario, 
including nuclear war.
[Nuclear effects and jamming are likely to degrade C3, thus limiting 
recallability and retargeting.]
 
B-2 is needed for SRT missions.
[Analysis shows that no special capability exists or is foreseen.]
 
4.  On Obsolescence
 
B-52 age mandates replacement.
[Air Force data show B-52-G&H viability for many years to come.]
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Table I.2:  The Land Leg:  Beliefs Versus Findings
 
BELIEF		FINDING
 
1.  On ICBM Base Survivability
 
Silo-based ICBMs have been highly vulnerable to massive, surprise Soviet 
attack.
[Claims for high vulnerability were based on worst-case estimates of 
Soviet ICBM capabilities, as well as other questionable assumptions.]
 
2.  On Penetration Survivability
 
ICBMs face no effective ABM defenses.
[Available data support this view.]
 
3.  On Target Coverage
 
ICBM C3 is prompt, reliable and has great redundancy.
[Available data generally support this perception.]
 
ICBMs can launch promptly after receipt of orders for attack.
[Available data support this conclusion, but are based on launches from 
test silos and simulated electronic launch tests.]
 
Peacekeeper is very accurate and very reliable.
[DOD's refusal to provide critical reliability data and insufficient 
operational tests reduce the level of confidence in Peacekeeper's 
performance estimates.]
 
Rail garrison Peacekeepers and mobile SICBMs would have the same accuracy 
and reliability as ICBMs in silos.
[Insufficient data to support this belief.]
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Table I.3:  The Sea Leg:  Beliefs Versus Findings
 
BELIEF		FINDING
 
1.  On Survivability
 
While submerged SSBNs are currently hard to detect, a breakthrough in 
detection technology that will threaten them is possible in the future.
[No current, near- or far-term submarine detection technologies, 
potential applications, or Soviet capability would be effective in 
reliably locating a single submerged, deployed U.S. SSBN, much less the 
entire fleet.]
 
2.  On Penetration Survivability
 
SLBMs face no effective ABM defenses.
[Available data support this assumption.]
 
3.  On Target Coverage
 
C3 to SSBNs is much slower and much less reliable than to ICBM silos.
[Data show C3 to SSBNs is about as prompt and as reliable as to ICBM 
silos, under a range of conditions.]
 
SLBMs cannot be used against time urgent targets due to a combination of 
slow C3 and launch procedures.
[Compared to ICBMs, no operationally meaningful difference in time to 
target was found.  Arms control agreements will severely reduce the 
number of "time-urgent' Soviet ICBM targets.
 
SLBMs cannot effectively attack the hardest category of Soviet targets 
due to insufficient accuracy.
[Test data show that D-5 SLBMs do in fact have this capability.]
 
Range and deployment area limitations may weaken sea leg accuracy and 
survivability.
[SSBN patrol areas and D-5 range and estimated accuracy impose no such 
limitations.]
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Table II.  GAO's Findings on Significant Knowledge Limitations Vis-a-Vis 
Three Dimensions of Strategic Weapons System Assessment.
 
			Air				Land				Sea
			B-2	B-1B	B-52		Peace-	MM III		D-5/
							keeper			Ohio
 
Threata		X	X	X		X		X		X
 
Performanceb	X	X	X		X
 
Testingb		X	X			X		X
 
aThreat or performance has been incorrectly reported on at least one 
significant dimension.
 
bOperational testing has experienced a significant qualitative or 
quantitative problem or limitation.